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Teaching a neural network to fly — without redesigning it for flight

EVOLEO Technologies, Airbus Defence and Space, and TUM

A PROJECT BY EVOLEO, AIRBUS DEFENCE AND SPACE & TUM

AI4NCA — ESA-backed technology development

Inside AI4NCA: how a maritime-safety AI model went from a laptop GPU onto a flight-representative processor board built to European space-industry standards — and what happened when it got there.

TRL 4→6
Board maturity raised over the project, verified as flight-representative hardware
0.60
Mean detection accuracy (mAP) across the full test set
5.3 FPS
Images processed per second, running on the board itself
~543 days
Estimated time in orbit before radiation effects would start to matter
Processor board under test, mounted in a calibration jig
FIG. 1 — The processor board at the centre of AI4NCA, under dimensional inspection during assembly.

THE PROBLEM

Most on-board AI accelerators are designed once, for one job

AI4NCA — “AI for Non-Mission Critical On-Board Data Processing” — set out to answer a narrower, more practical question: can a generic, programmable hardware accelerator run modern deep-learning models on a spacecraft, within the size, power, and radiation constraints of a non-mission-critical processing unit, without being redesigned for each new network?

A chip built for one specific network is more efficient at that one job. A generic, programmable accelerator trades away some of that efficiency for the freedom to run a variety of neural networks over its lifetime — useful when a mission's needs might change after launch. AI4NCA tests that trade-off directly, carrying two independent AI use cases through the same pipeline: shrink a conventional neural network down to run on limited hardware, load it onto real silicon, and measure what survives the trip.

TWO USE CASES, ONE PIPELINE

One model went to hardware. The other stayed in simulation — deliberately.

DEPLOYED · ON-BOARD

Maritime Safety

Autonomous detection, classification, and length estimation of ships — fishing and non-fishing — from satellite radar imagery, using a modified YOLO detector shrunk down to run on limited hardware.

8,621 satellite images
Training data
Modified YOLO
Network
The flight-representative board
Runs on
Full on-hardware test campaign
Verified by

SIMULATION ONLY

Active MTF Control

Active-optics wavefront-error correction for larger-aperture optical instruments, using a modified EfficientNetB0 to work out the correction needed from a pair of photos.

1.5 m, single circular
Aperture
Modified EfficientNetB0
Network
Simulation only — no hardware
Runs on
24.03 nm mean residual error
Result

THE HARDWARE

A board that had to prove it was the real thing, not a stand-in

The processor at the centre of AI4NCA is an AMD-Xilinx Versal AI Edge chip — and the deliverable wasn’t just running code on it. The board carrying that chip had to be verified as form, fit, and function equivalent to a real flight module: the same size, the same connectors, the same behaviour a spacecraft would actually see.

THE CHIP

Versal AI Edge

Pin-compatible with a radiation-tolerant flight version of the same part. It combines a dedicated AI compute array with a block of reconfigurable logic — the “programmable accelerator” that lets it run more than one kind of neural network.

ADHA STANDARD

Built to slot into a real spacecraft bus

The board was reviewed against ADHA, a European space-industry architecture standard covering module dimensions, the backplane connector it plugs into, and how it talks to the rest of a spacecraft — not a lab-only prototype, but a module built to the same rulebook a flight unit would answer to.

Assembled processor board in a test jig with calipers
FIG. 2 — The assembled board during bring-up, being checked against its required dimensions.
ADHA backplane connector board
FIG. 3 — The backplane the module plugs into — the shared connector standard that lets modules from different suppliers sit on the same spacecraft bus.
CAD render of the processor board layout
FIG. 4 — Board layout: memory and flash storage surrounding the processor chip at the centre.

Testing didn’t happen only on EVOLEO’s own board. Part of the campaign ran on ESA’s OBPAI facility — a remote evaluation platform that gives approved projects controlled access to the same family of flight-representative chip, similar in spirit to how a cloud development environment gives you access to a remote machine without that machine sitting on your desk. It's a way of testing against representative hardware without every team needing its own physical board.

THE TOOLCHAIN

From a floating-point model to something the chip can run

Both networks were trained conventionally — ordinary floating-point arithmetic, on a regular GPU. Getting from there to the board runs through AMD’s Vitis AI toolchain: it compresses the model’s numbers down from floating-point to 8-bit integers, then compiles the result into a form the chip’s reconfigurable logic can execute directly.

That compression step is where a lot of the real engineering happens. Going from floating-point precision to 8-bit integers isn’t free — it’s a controlled loss of precision, and part of AI4NCA’s job was to measure exactly how much accuracy it cost.

TaskMetricBefore compressionAfter compression
DetectionAccuracy0.6590.638
Classification (fishing)Accuracy0.6040.567
Length estimateAccuracy0.7130.709

Measured on a held-out set of 862 images. The accuracy lost to compression stayed under 5% on every task — the margin that makes running the model on board worthwhile in the first place, instead of sending raw imagery back to the ground for processing.

VALIDATING THE MODEL

Before it ever touched flight hardware

These two results come from an earlier stage of the project — the trained model evaluated on a development computer, against a large test set, before compression and before it was ever loaded onto a board. They show the model works; the hardware results further down show it keeps working once it’s deployed.

Confusion matrix for the ship detection and classification model
FIG. 5 — How often the model’s predictions matched reality, across the full test set. Model-level result, not measured on the board.
Ground truth versus predicted ship detection on satellite radar imagery
FIG. 6 — A single frame from that same evaluation: the labelled ship (left) and the model’s own detection (right). Model-level result, not measured on the board.

RUNNING ON THE BOARD

What actually happened once the model was on real hardware

From here on, every number was measured with the compressed model actually running on the processor board — not simulated, not estimated from the development-computer results above.

0.778
Detection accuracy score, on board

A combined measure of how rarely the model misses a real ship and how rarely it flags something that isn’t one. 1.0 would be perfect on both counts.

109.1 MB
Memory the model takes up once loaded

Small enough to share the board’s memory comfortably with everything else the processor needs to do.

11–15 W
Power draw, idle through to active inference

Roughly what a bright household lightbulb uses — modest by design, since spacecraft power budgets leave little room to spare.

5.3–6.7 FPS
Images processed per second, on board

5.3 FPS reflects a single image end-to-end; 6.7 FPS is the steady-state rate across 1,000 back-to-back runs. Either way, a new image is fully processed roughly every fifth of a second — without waiting on a link to the ground.

Power draw over time during the 1000-inference benchmark
FIG. 7 — Power draw measured continuously across a 1,000-inference run on the board.

RADIATION ROBUSTNESS

Simulating nearly a year and a half in orbit, one bit-flip at a time

Cosmic radiation in orbit occasionally flips individual bits in a chip’s memory — including the numbers that make up a trained model. Left unprotected, enough of these “single-event upsets” will eventually corrupt a model's accuracy. To find out how many is “enough,” the team deliberately corrupted increasing numbers of bits in the deployed model and re-measured its accuracy after each step, then compared that against how often such upsets are actually expected to happen in orbit.

Model performance metrics versus number of bit-flips inserted, operational range
FIG. 8 — Accuracy and related metrics as bits are deliberately corrupted, across the range expected in real orbital operation. No meaningful drop-off is visible at this scale.

A trained neural network has a lot of built-in redundancy — the same over-parameterization that makes it easier to train also means it can absorb a certain number of corrupted values before its output visibly suffers. At the rate radiation upsets are expected to actually occur in orbit, that redundancy was enough to cover roughly 543 days — about a year and a half — before any measurable accuracy loss, with no additional radiation-hardening built into the software.

SECOND USE CASE — SIMULATED ONLY

Reading a wavefront error out of two ordinary-looking photographs

Active MTF Control takes a different kind of input: two images of the same scene, one in focus and one deliberately thrown out of focus. The gap between them encodes exactly how an optical system’s lens or mirror is distorting the image — and a modified EfficientNetB0 was trained to read that gap back out as a correction.

Focused input image
FIG. 9 — Focused input
Deliberately defocused input image
FIG. 10 — Deliberately defocused
Aberrated point spread function
FIG. 11 — The resulting distortion pattern, visualized
Residual wavefront error versus input error, with diffraction-limited threshold
FIG. 12 — How much distortion was left after correction, across many test cases. In 93% of cases, the leftover error was small enough to be effectively invisible to the instrument.

On average, the correction left an error small enough to be close to the theoretical limit of what the optics themselves could resolve — comparable to the softening you’d get from ordinary sensor noise. No physical optical bench existed to test this against, so the whole correction loop — camera, distortion, and fix — was reconstructed and run entirely in simulation. It was never deployed on real hardware, and the project treats it accordingly: a validated idea, not a flown one.

WHERE THIS GOES NEXT

From a validated workflow to a qualified, flyable one

Both use cases now have a working answer to “can this run on non-mission-critical hardware?” — one proven on real silicon, one proven in simulation. The next steps are to carry the maritime-safety workflow through formal flight qualification, and to work toward demonstrating it in orbit.

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